American Foreign Policy World War II

Before directly discussing the US entry into the war, we should first discuss some of the background. Of course, you are familiar with events in Asia in the 1930s (Japan's seizure of Manchuria) and you probably know a great deal about WWII in Europe (we will review some of that in a moment) but first we should discuss a little more about what happened in Latin America.

The Good Neighbor Policy

Remember that beginning in the 1890s, there was a long list of US military interventions in Latin America. You can imagine that the response in Latin America was negative. FDR began to implement what he called the "Good Neighbor Policy" where he began to reduce American military involvement in Latin America and strengthen economic ties to Latin American countries. In 1933, the US even accepted an agreement made in Montevideo, Uruguay by a Pan-American Conference that "no country has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another." These policies greatly improved America's image in Latin America. Of course, America did not totally withdraw from Latin American politics; for example, the US supported the dictator Anastasio Somoza who came to power in Nicaragua: Somoza was both corrupt and brutal but he always supported US policy so the US gave him aid.
An important result of these polices was that during WWII, none of the Latin American countries considered challenging US policy. The US did not need to fear another Zimmerman telegram.

Pre-War Europe and Asia

Several events threatened the peace in pre-War Europe. In1935, Italy defeated Ethiopia, which was a member of the League of Nations, but the League only imposed weak sanctions. In 1936, Hitler violated the WWI peace treaty by seizing the Rhineland. In the same year, Francisco Franco attempted (and was successful in1939) to overthrow the government of the Spanish Republic and replace it with a fascist government.
The US response was divided. Strong isolationist forces controlled Congress (although most Congressmen did not favor extreme isolationism) and passed a series of Neutrality laws. The laws, taken together, forbade Americans from sending arms or loans to countries engaged in wars (including civil wars like Spain). Later, the law was changed so that Americans could sell arms on a "cash and carry" basis--meaning that the country needed to pay for the arms in cash and needed to ship it in their own ships. The object was to stop incidents like the sinking of American ships and support for one side in any war that might break out so that America would not be tempted to enter the war.
By 1938, Hitler's treatment of Jews encouraged FDR to call a conference to try to convince countries to allow Jews in as immigrants: no country at the conference, except Holland, admitted substantially increased numbers of Jews. FDR felt the US couldn't allow more immigrants due to the depression; later, when reports of the killing of increased numbers of Jews in Germany were given, FDR allowed Jews in the US on Visitor visas to stay beyond the expiration of their visas, but he refused to fight with Congress over increasing the immigration levels.
In 1937, Japan invaded a larger part of China. FDR refused to apply the neutrality law, knowing that it would favor Japan since the Japanese army was better equipped than the Chinese army. FDR called for a conference in Brussels, Belgium, to respond to aggression by both Germany and Japan; even the USSR attended and sought an alliance with the US to cooperate against Japan and Germany, but the US refused and little substantive came out of the conference. The major response by FDR to all these situations was to drastically increase defense preparations both with regard to building ships and airplanes.
In 1938, Germany took control of Austria and demanded part of Czechoslovakia (the Sudetenland). FDR told the British and French, who had earlier promised to defend Czechoslovakia, that the US could not assist them; Stalin, however, offered Soviet assistance. However, the English and French did not believe the Soviet army was really capable of help, so at the Munich conference they agreed to give the Sudetenland to Germany (without consulting the government of Czechoslovakia). Shortly thereafter, Germany demanded the rest of Czechoslovakia and its ally, Italy conquered Albania.
Germany signed a non-aggression pact with the USSR. A week later, Hitler attacked Poland (Stalin attacked Poland & the Baltic states). England & France declared war on Germany, and WWII began.

US POLICY DURING WWII
Policy before US Entry in the War

While the US did not really want to enter the war, US objectives included stopping German and Japanese expansion because such expansion threatened US interests. Further, US public opinion was slowly changing, particularly after reports of the holocaust and the clear German aggression against Poland. The fact that England was not quickly defeated by Germany and fought under difficult conditions made Americans sympathetic to the Allies.
Still, many in the US favored neutrality and saw benefits in staying out of the war: for example, a US Senator from Missouri named Harry Truman once said, after Germany attacked the USSR," when Germany is winning, we should help Stalin, when the USSR is winning, we should help Hitler," with the idea being that Americans opposed both ideologies, Nazism and Communism, and therefore we should hope that both countries weaken themselves.
In 1940, Japan attacked French Indochina; the US established an embargo that stopped US iron & steel exports to Japan.
FDR's response to Germany was slower. The Lend-Lease Act was passed in 1940 that allowed the US to lend ships to England who agreed to return them after the war. Both the President and Congress felt that the public would accept this better than giving financial loans or actually entering the war.
Two more important events occurred before the US entered the

war. First, the USSR and Japan signed a non-aggression treaty. This

allowed Japan to focus on southeast Asia and the Pacific (and to

attack the US). Second, Hitler decided to attack the USSR

.
US Entry into WWII
The US entry into the war is straightforward: the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor made war unavoidable. The next day, FDR asked Congress for a declaration of war in his famous speech. Therefore, the immediate cause for US entry is clear; there are, of course, many things that we could consider about the failure of earlier US policies to either prevent war with Japan, or prepare US defenses better for the War; instead, we shall focus our attention on US policy during the war to better understand the Cold War era.

US Policy During the War

In 1941, before Pearl Harbor, FDR had secretly met with Churchill and signed the Atlantic Charter which stated the Allies' war objectives: 1) self-government for all; 2) freedom of the seas;3) postwar security system; 4) freedom from fear and want; 5) fair and open economic system. Churchill accepted these because he needed US help, although he recognized that it would realistically mean the end of the British Empire; Stalin accepted them with a reservation guaranteeing that he need not comply with the promises.
After entering the war, the Americans quickly insisted on a Unified Allied Military Command for the allied armies (except the Soviets who had refused to declare war on Japan at that time). The major strategic question was when the Allies should invade Europe. Stalin wanted the US and Britain to invade at the earliest possible time because it would force the Nazis to remove some of the armies that were invading the USSR; the British and Americans favored a delayed invasion because the American military felt that it was not fully prepared for such an invasion.
The British and Americans did attack the Germans and Italians in North Africa in 1942 and in Italy in 1943; mostly American forces fought against Japan in the Pacific beginning in 1942. It was not until June 1944 that the British and Americans attacked German-occupied France. By that time, the Soviets had driven the Germans from the USSR and were fighting the Germans in Poland and Romania. The Allies were beginning to win victories in the Pacific. It is interesting to note that many of the strategic decisions at the end of the war in Europe were influenced by the desire of both the US (with the assistance of the British) and the Soviets to control as much territory as possible in Europe by the time of Germany's surrender so that they could be in a better position to negotiate the post-war structure of Europe.
In Asia, there were two major decisions. The first was the US

desire that the Soviets should enter the war with Japan; Stalin

agreed to this, but in fact postponed Soviet participation until

the last few months of the war when the Soviets took territory from

Japan that Japan had won from Russia in the Russo-Japanese War. The

second decision was the use of the atomic weapon which had been

secretly developed by the US (both Germany and the USSR were

working on developing similar kinds of weapons). The decision to use the weapon was made by President Truman, who justified the

decision on the grounds that a conventional invasion of Japan would

have cost many American lives. Critics of the decision contend

that, first, the bombs were used partially out of racism (why were

they not used against European Germany?); second, the use of the weapons was not really necessary to win the war; third, the weapons

were really used to intimidate the USSR into accepting US

conditions on the post-war structure of Europe; fourth, that the

use of such terrible weapons could never be justified.

The Origins of the Cold War

At the conclusion of WWII it was difficult to predict what path USFP would take. It seemed that US-USSR cooperation was
equally as likely as outright conflict. In truth, the era of the Cold War which followed was probably the result of at
least three or four important influences on USFP: 1) the geo-political shape of the post-war world (i.e., the
international environment) largely determined by the agreements in the WWII conferences and the differing
positions of military power in Europe and Asia; 2) the US belief in containment as both an effective policy and an
ideology (this is both a result of US leadership and beliefs); 3) the crisis over Korea which tended to reinforce
the beliefs of US decision-makers believing in the ideology of containment and 4) the anti-communist beliefs of the US
population generally and the McCarthy crusade in particular. One last characteristic of importance is the fact that almost
from the outset, the confrontation between the superpowers was framed by the nuclear arms race.
In this part of the course, we will examine the ideology and policy of containment. We will briefly look at its
origins and logic, examine how the Korean conflict reinforced it, the implications for USFP generally, and the particular
manifestations in US Cold War policy of creating alliances.

The Origins of Containment
In February of 1946, George Kennan, a senior member of the American Embassy in Moscow, sent a telegram to Washington
suggesting the course of future USFP toward the USSR. Kennan was perhaps the most knowledgeable expert on Russia/USSR in
the State Department. In 1946, Kennan believed that Stalin was not strong enough and had no intention of attacking US
interests in Japan and Europe; at the same time, he believed that the Communists had no serious intention of cooperating
with the US; further, he did not support the idea that the US should try to force the USSR to immediately free Eastern
Europe.
Instead, as his LONG TELEGRAM explained, he thought that the best strategy would be to be patient with the Soviets,
yet to "contain" Soviet attempts to increase their power. Kennan said that the Communists needed to show the Russian
people that the West was evil and an enemy of the USSR; any immediate attack by the US would allow the Soviets to rally
their people to support communism in the same way the Nazi attack had strengthened Stalin a few years earlier. However,
if the US failed to respond to Soviet advances around the world, it would make the West appear weak and also would
strengthen Communist rule in the USSR. Kennan believed that if the US & the West could adequately apply "Counterforce at
a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points," the US could eventually disprove Marxism and there

would be "either the break-up or gradual mellowing of Soviet power."
Kennan also summarized these views a year later in his anonymous X ARTICLE in the journal Foreign Affairs. People
both inside and outside of government were impressed by the explanation that was provided for Soviet behavior--the USSR
was testing the West for weak spots. They also were satisfied that the explanation blamed the Soviets for the growing
tensions between the two countries.

These ideas were formalized in NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL PAPER 68 (NSC-68) in 1950 -- but it placed a heavier emphasis
upon military responses than Kennan had originally envisioned. NSC-68 assumed 1) only the US and USSR were
significant in the competition for global power; 2) USSR sought absolute power only in Russia & Eastern Europe but the
ideology of communism pushed the USSR to seek to extend its authority over much of the world; 3) conflict between the US-
USSR could, therefore, not be avoided; 4) since the USSR relied heavily upon military power, the US could only contain
Soviet expansion through using US military power; 5) this conflict was not endless--the Soviet government had only weak
support from its people, so if the US could frustrate Soviet advances then the Russians might eventually change the Soviet
system from within.
To implement this strategy, NSC-68 proposed a massive American military build-up. It emphasized that the US could
not rely on its nuclear threat alone but needed troops and conventional weapons to fight in a "limited war." President
Truman accepted NSC-68 in April 1950 but he was cautious about the costs of the proposed military build-up. Events in
Korea, however, made the military build-up easy to implement politically.